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DEEDS TO "HEIRS" OF A
LIVING PERSON
By EDwix W. HADLEY, A. B., J. D.
The purpose of a deed is to transfer property, and without
a transferee there is no transfer. This failure may vitiate the
whole deed, or any part of it which lacks a grantee for the
particular interest there dealt with; and since an interest can-
not be left hanging, it is deemed to have remained in the grantor
unless he provided otherwise. Our premise is axiomatic. Thus
a deed to a purely fictitious person has no legal effect.
In determining whether there is a grantee capable of hold-
ing a particular interest, the cburts have of course followed the
doctrine, id certum est quod certum redii potest. Hence, when it
is actually proven that the grantor intended a certain person
when he named "my son", or "J. S.", or "the legatees and de-
visees of X, deceased",' the proof is admissible whether intrin-
sic or aliunde and the court will look on the said person as a
named and certain grantee. So a conveyance to the heirs of one
deceased has been held to have a definite grantee, the persons
meant being ascertainable.2
Suppose that realty be deeded to the "heirs" of a person
who is living at the moment the instrument takes effect? It
has long been settled that nenzo est haeres viventis; there is no
such creature as the "heir" of a living person. Herein the law
has adopted the most strict plilological definition. Therefore
it would seem at first glance that such an instrument fails to
designate a grantee, and so fails to pass anyting under the
rule of our first paragraph. But the phrase which is in itself
uncertain may, under the rule of our second paragraph, be ex-
plained by extrinsic or intrinsic evidence to have been intended
by the grantor as a designation of some certain person or per-
sons, the word "heir" or "heirs" amounting to such designa-
tion in the grantor's vocabulary. This was permitted at
common law as to the singular, "heir", but not as to the plural,
"heirs". The principle of holding the intent back of a word
1. Webb v. Den. 17 How. (U.S.) 676, 15 L. Ed. 35.
2. Tiffany, R. P., 2nd Ed., p. 1594, note 49; 18 C. J. 159.
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to be the intent usually back of such word is most easily over-
come by affirmative proof that the word always had a certain
peculiar meaning to the one who executed the instrument, the
idiosyncrasy being purely personal or perhaps a usage of his
business or community. But as to the word "heir" such proof
is seldom available, for the simple reason that the one'who drew
the instrument generally has not previously used the word often
enough to show its meaning to him. Then we must turn to
intrinsic evidence, other parts of the instrument itself.
The first and easiest type of such evidence is the use else-
wihere in the deed of other and diffrent words in describing the
grantee. If in a deed to "heirs" of X" the instrument later
says "and the said eldest child," the word "heir" may be held
to mean {the eldest child of X. To A. and "such heirs as she
may have" has been held to give the special meaning of
"children". In Seymour v. Bowles, 172 Ill. 521, 50 N. E. 122,
"minor heirs" was held to provide sufficient "evidence that
"heirs" meant "children". In Tinder v. Tinder, 131 Ind. 381,
30 N. E. 1077, the deed was to "Sarah A. Tinder and the heirs
of Simeon Tinder and Sarah A. Tinder", and the Court held
although the named parties were still alive the deed was a good
present transfer, the grantees being the children of the Tinders.
This language might easily have been held to mean the heirs
of their bodies, persons not presently determinable, so the case
is a strong one and shows how important is the general prin-
ciple that a conveyance is to be construed most strongly against
the grantor who chose the words, and in favor of validity.
Cases accepting this first type of evidence to vary the usual
meaning of the word "heirs" are numerous.3 The same type of
evidence is also commonly accepted to vary the meaning of the
word when used in a will.
In Heath v. Hewitt, 127 N. Y. 166, 27 N. E. 959, the deed was
"between Benjamin Heath of the first part and the heirs of
Warren Heath of the second part ** excepting and reserving
to myself the whole use and absolute control of the said prem-
3. Southern Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 150 Ala. 212, 43 So. 487; McDill v.
Meyer, 94 Ark. 615, 128 S. W. 364; Black v. Stephenson, 166 Ark. 429. 267
S.. W. 130; Henderson v. Sawyer, 99 Ga. 234, 25 S. E. 312; Howard v. Sebas-
tian, 143 Ky. 237, 136 S. W. 226; Polley v. Adkins, 145 Ky. 370, 140 S. W.
551; Mullins v. Moberly, 145 Ky. 477, 140 S. W. 652; Hunt v. Hunt, 154 Ky.
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ises during my natural life ** and to my son, Warren, during
his natural life." The Court held that "heirs" meant the
"present children" of the grantor's son, Warren, because in
looking at the deed as a whole language is found which
recognizes that the ancestor of the so-called heirs is still alive and
hence the only persons whom the grantor could have contem-
plated for a present transfer were the children4 . It seems per-
fectly fair and reasonable to accept this type of evidence, also;
especially when we remember that construction is strongest
against the grantor, that in deeds as well as wills the whole in-
strument must be looked to when the intent is involved, and that
public policy calls for the stability and validity of apparent titles
where such is reasonably possible.
In Roberson v. Warnler, 104 Va. 380, 51 S. E. 835, the deed
was to the "John B. F. Roberson heirs in consideration of the
natural love and affection they have for their sd. son, and espec-
ially for his heirs." The Court held that ithe grantees, definite
and ascertained, were John's chilldren, although the deed used
no other description than "heirs" and there was .no clear evi-
dence in it of a consciousness that John was then living. The
Court first stated the general rule that a deed as well as a will
must be construed by looking at the whole instrument and fair-
ly trying to determine the intention of the parties. This prin-
ciple lies back of all cases in which the technical meaning of
"heirs" is varied, and is modernly settled in spite of some early
cases to the contrary. The Court then pointed out that the" deed
called for support of the grantor by the grantees, mentioned re-
pairs to be maintained by the grantees, mentioned that the res-
idence of the grantees is a certain county, and declared affection for
679, 159 S. W. 528; Whitworth v. Whitworth, (Ky.) 265 S. W. 801 ("T. G.
Whitworth's bodily heirs" held to mean present children. The evidence in
this 'language seeems very scant.); Vmfreville v. Keeler, 1 Thomp. and
Cook (N. Y.) 486; Huss v. Stephens, 51 Pa. 282 ("to the heirs of Andrew
Lantz. in consideration of the natural love and affection he hath for his
grandchildren"); Darrah v. Darrah, 202 Pa. 492, 52 Atl. 183; Duckett v. But-
ler, 67 S. C. 130, 45 S. E. 137, (to A. and "at her death to such heir or heirs
as she may hereafter have" ; Reeves v. Cook, 71 S. C. 275, 278, 51 S. B. 93;
Rembert v. Evans, 86 S. C. 445, 68 S. E. 659; Fountain Co. v. Beckleheimer,
102 Ind. 76, 1 N. E. 202 (io A. "and her present heirs"); Brasington v.
Hanson, 149 Pa. 289, 24 Atl. 344 (children actually named). See a dictum
In Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hoppin, 214 Fed. 928, 933, citing a number of other
cases wherein other -words alter the actual meaning of "heirs".
4. Using such evidence to vary the technical meaning of heirs, see
Tanner v. Ellis, (Ky.) 127 S. W. 995; See v. Derr, 57 MIch. at 372, 24 i. W.
at 109; Fullagar v. Stockdale, 138 Mich. 363, 101 N. W. 576; Heard v. Horton,
1 Denio (N. Y.) 165; Vanorsdall v. Van Deventer, 51 Barb. (N. Y.) iS7.
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the grantees to be part of the consideration. This evidence as a
whole was felt to show that the grantor intended his deed to
have a present effect on present persons; and since to have this
effect the word "heirs" must be interpreted as "children", that
meaning was given. It is to be noted that none of this evidence
is conclusive, it being perfectly possible that the grantor still
intended that the grantees should only be determined by the
death of the ancestor, legally standing in the shoes of that ances-
tor. The, acceptance of intent that the deed have a present effect
therefore is a liberal view, subject to the objection that it at least
verges on looking into the secret and unexpressed intent of the gran-
tor5 . A similar attitude was taken in Texaso Co. v. Meador, (Tex.)
243 S. W. 991, wherein "M. C. Arnold and her heirs" was held to
mean children because the consideration is recited as coming from
"Arnold and her heirs" and so "heirs" probably meant living per-
sons capable of furnishing a consideration. Apparently in accord
are Findley v. Hill, 133 Ala. 229, 32 So. 497, and Eckle v. Ryland,
256 Mo. 424, 165 S. W. 1035, 1042. The language of Tanner v.
Ellis, (Ky.) 127 S. W. 995 looks the same way. This attitude of
giving effect to a deed whenever possible has been codified in
North Carolina by Revisal 1905, sec. 1583, where it is provided
that a deed to .the heirs of a living person is to be construed as
meaning children unless a contrary intention actually appears in
the deed6 . In a note in 4 Mich. Law Rev. 234 it is hinted that
in Roberson v. Wampler, supra, the words "sd. son" show an ex-
pressed knowledge that the son is living and so puts the case on the
same basis as Heath v. Hewitt. This seems hardly justified, for love
and affection might well be presently felt for a deceased son.
We have shown three types of evidence which have been
held sufficient to give to "heirs" a special meaning, such as
"children": first, description of or reference to them by the deed
in o'ther words; second, language in the deed recognizing that
the ancestor of the "heirs" is still alive; and third, the apparent
intent of the whole deed to have a transfer to present effect and
5. Using such evidence, see a very liberal decision by Lumpkin, J.,
in Tharp v. Yarbrough, 79 Ga. 382, 4 S. E. 915. And see Bailey v. Willis,
56 Tex. 212.
6. See Condor v. Secrest, 149 N. C. 201, 62 S. E. 921. Applying the
same principle, where the grantee is uncertain for other reasons, see 18
C. J. 175, text and notes.
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validity. We may say, therefore, that a deed to ithose non-exis-
tent persons, the "heirs" of a living person, may be saved as a
valid transfer of a present estate by proper proof7 that the word
meant a very certain person or persons, now determinable and
determined independent of the death of the ancestor.
Even though the usual meaning of "heirs" cannot be altered
under the facts of a particular deed, there is another means by
which the deed may be upheld. If an intermediate estate is created
in the deed, giving the heirs a remainder on the contingency of
their becoming ascertained, their present indefiniteness does not
at once vitiate the grant to them.8 The grant is temporarily
good as to the future as well as the present, and if the grantees
have become definite by death of the ancestor, on or before the
termination of the intermediate estate, they may then take. By
statute in England, and in many American States, the ascertain-
ment of the grantees is effective even after the ending of the
intermediate estate, so long as the Rule Against Perpetuities is
not violatei (Tiffany, R. P., 2nd ed., p. 508; Ill. Laws 1921,
p. 470).
There is still another possibility. Why may it not be said
that a deed to the "heirs" of a living person, actually meaning
heirs and without an intermediate estate, creates an executory
interest? When the contingency of their ascertainment is resolved,
an estate springs up and vests in them as a springing use, void
at common law but valid under fhe Statute of Uses. This stat-
ute has been followed or substantially re-enacted in most Ameri-
can States. Under such an interpretation, the fee is considered
to remain temporarily in the grantor and his heirs (or is con-
sidered to be in abeyance in a few jurisdictions), and when the
grantee becomes ascertained the fee passes to him by automatic
operation of the Statute. It is today quite settled that in a deed
to an ascertained person it may validly be provided that al-
though no other estate is to intervene the grant for the present
is to be executory and is to ripen into a vested estate at some
time in the future. The creation of such a future estate is gener-
7. For some cases in which the evidence was held insufficient, see
18 C. J. 159 note 86.
8. Tiffany, R. P. p. 1595 55; DuBois v. Judy, 291 I1. 340, 126 N. E.
,104.
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ally allowed by devise to persons unascertained as well as ascertained.9
It is submitted that there is no valid objection to creating such an
estate or interest by deed where the grantee is not in esse or other-
wise unascertained. Since the actual transfer is deemed- to be
made by force of the Statute of Uses, it makes no difference if
there is no definite grantee at the time the deed is executed, for
the Statute will hang back and only function when the grantee
has become ascertained and otherwise ready to take. Livery of
seisin is no longer a necessity, nor need there be a grantee to
furnish 'the consideration because .consideration may now validly
come from a third party, so to require a grantee in esse when an
executory interest is created by deed is not based on either prac-
tical necessity or legal logic. Mr. Gray and Mr. Tiffany have
both argued in favor of the proposition here approved. Care-
ful note should be taken of a principle stated in 18 C. J. 157: "A
conveyance of land by deed may be considered as any species of
conveyance necessary to effect the intent of the parties to the
deed and not repugnant to the terms of it." Therefore a deed to
a grantee not ascertained should be called a declaration of a use,
which use will hang like a fungus to the legal fee till operated
upon by the Statute when the grantee is ascertained within the
period of perpetuities. The majority of cases, however, un-
reasonably refuse to allow an executory interest by bargain and
sale deed where there is no present and definite grantee; they
are collected in Tiffany, R. P., 2nd ed., p. 550 and p. 1595 note 53.
Many of these cases are diota, and they are not so numerous as
to put the point beyond argument. The proper principle seems
to be applied in Southern Ry. Co. v. Hayes, 150 Ala. 212, 43 So. 487,
where a deed to the heirs of a living person was allowed to in-
clude after-born children on the theory that on birth they auto-
matically become tenants in common with the children who were
alive when the deed was executed. A scant distinction of the
case might be made on the ground that some of the grantees
were present to furnish the consideration and take livery of
seisin, but since neither of these-things are necessary the distinc-
tion is one without a difference. The co-grantees occupy only
a formal position, so we should be able to let the grantor himself
9. Tiffany, R. P. p. 554,, text and note 23, and p. 488 note 71, citing
many cases.
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occupy such position after he declares the use, he and his heirs
furnishing the consideration and holding the fee as quasi-trustees
for a sole and unascertained' grantee. The language of Mellichamp
v. Mellichamp, 28 S. C. 125, 5 S. E. 333, is also in accord with the
view here contended for.
The application of the principle just discussed is of interest
in connection with the recent case of Legout v. Price, 149 N. E. 427,
decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois on October 28, 1925, and
published last month. The important language of the deed there
involved is as follows:
"This indenture :: between Julian Legout :: and the heirs
of Adolphus Legout :: do grant, bargain and sell (described
property) :: Provided always that Adolphus Legout may
retain the possession of, and have the use of the lands dur-
ing his lifetime. It is also understood and agreed that the
said Julian Legout do hereby reserve during his lifetime.the
rent off all the land herein conveyed."
The Court, npeaking through Chief Justice Dunn, held that
the deed* was totally void and ineffectual for lack of a definite
grantee. The opinion fails to mention the general principle of
construdtion in favor of validity and hence fails to consider solu-
tions which an orderly and full attack would have unravelled and
brought to mind. There is no attempt to construe the word
"heirs," and of course no theorizing on the existence of a valid
executory interest. The possibility of -upholding the grant
through existence of an intermediate estate is discussed only in
part, mention being made of only one of the two intermediate
estates attempted. The whole horizon of counsel or court, or
both, seems blotted out by the prima facie mist of neino est haeres
vzventis.
After realizing the prima facie invalidity of the deed, it would
be well to remember the principles of construction and take at
least a casual look for means of effectuating the intent of the
grantor. The deed is to the "heirs" of a living person. Giving
technical meaning to the words, there is -no grantee, and since
the transfer purports to'be of present effect it fails. But can the
uncertainty be reduced to a certainty?
Nowhere in the deed are the grantees described in other
words. The word "heirs" is not even qualified, as it would be
by "present Heirs", "heirs of their bodies," "heirs she has or may
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have," "minor heirs," "said eldest child," "the aforesaid grand-
children," et -cetera. The only bit of evidence that might pos-
sibly qualify under the first type discussed, to vary the technical
meaning of the word, is the statement in the deed that it is
"agreed" that the grantor shall retain the rents for life. The
very idea of agreement necessitates two parties capable of
promising and communicating with each other, so it might be
said that this word makes the deed show on its face that the
grantees intended are the living children of Adolphus Legout,
who are ascertained and capable of making an agreement as well
as taking a present title under a bargain and sale.
The second type of evidence for varying the usual meaning
of "heirs" seems clearly present. The deed attempts to give a
present estate to the ancestor of the "heirs," which shows that
at that moment the grantor consciously knew that the ancestor
was still alive and so was thinking about and really attempting
to benefit the children. of Adolphus. This is the doctrine of Heath
v. Hz itt, supra, and it is submitted that such a deduction would be
reasonable and fair, as well as good policy in maintaining an ap-
parently valid deed and title. On this point the recent Illinois
case seems clearly to have erred.
Under the third and most lenient attitude, the deed at hand
of course would be good. The whole tenor of the instrument
shows an intent to pass the fee presently and at once; it purports
to bargain., it mentions an agreement, and it recites that consideration
has been actually received from the parties of the second part. The
more one examines this deed, the more it must appear that some-
where in the legal suit there was a serious failure of careful an-
alysis.
Even if we should grant that the Illinois Court was correct
in failing to find that "heirs" meant "present children" (which
we certainly do not grant,) the decision may still be wrong. If
the deed created an intermediate estate, the heirs were contin-
gent remaindermen and by the modern law did not need to be in
esse or otherwise ascertained at the moment the deed was ex-
ecuted. Judge Dunn discusses this point with Adolphus Legout
as grantee of the intermediate estate, and disposes of the argu-
ment on the ground that Adolphus took nothing for lack of pro-
per words of conveyance to him. and vords "may -etain and
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have the use of" being insufficient. This is probably correct;
but the Court fails to note that the deed also attempts to create,
or rather reserve, an intermediate estate in the grantor himself.
"Reserve" has generally held sufficient to give the grantor a
limited estate. It requires some straining 'to apply this idea
here, however, as the reservation is only of rent in a part of
the land.
The third solution mentioned in the first part of this article
might have been of aid to council for the grantees. Although
"heirs" meant just what it said and there was no valid inter-
mediate estate, it is arguable that the fee remained in the gran-
tor subject to a use which he had' attached to it by a voluntary and
formal declaration in writing. When the grantees become de-
finite and ascertained through the death of their father, the Illi-
nois Statute of Uses 0 will operate to turn the use into a legal
title in fee.
In conclusion, it is only fair to state that the decision is prob-
ably correct because the only matter officially before the Court
was a bill by Adolphus Legout attempting to have the fee de-
clared in him. We have merely raised a fictitious quarrel with
the case beccause the deed involved could raise all the solutions that
we have discussed for validating a deed to the "heirs" of a living
person. It is hoped that the purpose of forceful illustration
will pardon the fiction. A dictum in the case does lay it open to
'the criticisms here made, for in closing the Court says, "Since
there was no conveyance to him (Adolphus) of a life estate, the at-
tempted conveyance to his heirs in his lifetime was void, and
the instrument was wholly ineffectual." It is submitted that there
were several grounds on which effect could be given t'o the deed
as far as the "heirs" are concerned, in a proper case raising the
issue.
10. 111. Rev. Stat. 1903, C. 30, Sec. 3.
